Based upon the published German doctrine and the Tiger program guidance, the heavy tank battalion was formed with the primary focus of killing tanks. German doctrine envisioned a decisive tank battle once a penetration of the initial defensive line had been made. The heavy tank battalion was developed and fielded to fight that decisive tank battle. Originally, it was intended to fight that battle on the offensive during the breakthrough battle, but it was also capable of fighting from the defensive by counterattacking enemy armor penetrations as a mobile reserve.
From the initial employment until the Battle of Kursk, the heavy tank battalions evolved from the D organization, that integrated Tigers with Panzer IIIs, to the Tiger pure E organization. This change was done based upon experience gained in combat in North Africa and throughout Russia and was made possible by the increased Tiger production. The inclusion of Panzer IIIs provided the heavy tank battalion with a high degree of flexibility in tailoring the force required to accomplish the missions given. However, the Panzer IIIs were not heavily armored enough to survive long in combat with a heavy tank battalion.
The last two years of the war saw a dramatic increase in the number of heavy tank battalions. By the end of the war, some battalions had been destroyed and re-established two or three times. OKH and OKW committed the heavy tank battalions of the army and Waffen SS to almost every region of the European theater during the last two years of the war. The doctrine for the employment of the heavy tank battalions did not change officially during this time. This doctrine continued to be focused solely on the offensive, even though the battalions participated primarily in defensive battles. The principle of concentration, extremely important and valid in the offense, was also stressed in these defensive battles. This may have been a valid principle in the defense conceptually. In reality the limitations of the Tiger and Tiger II, along with the vast defensive frontages along which they were employed, invalidated this principle in many situations. When heavy tank battalions were concentrated in the defense, they were generally easier to bypass and/or were targeted for destruction by Allied armored units or from the air. The enemy naturally preferred to avoid the concentrated heavy tank battalions. When concentrated, the movement of the battalions to the threatened area reduced the operational number of Tigers because of their high maintenance requirements.
In the defense, heavy tank battalions were most effective when employed as a reserve force to counterattack enemy penetrations instead of as a frontline force. They were also most effective when they were dispersed along the breadth of the defensive front to cover more avenues of approach. This was especially true when the terrain restricted vehicular movement to a few avenues of approach.
One hour of Tiger operation requires ten hours of maintenance. — Alfred Rubbel
Whatever mission heavy tank battalions were given, their primary task was to destroy enemy tanks. In so doing, they were undeniably successful. The kill ratio of heavy tank battalions when measured against Tigers lost in direct combat is an impressive 12.2 to 1. The ratio as measured against all Tigers lost, regardless of reason, is still a credible 5.4 to 1 kill ratio.